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I. INTRODUCTION*
Since World War H, revolutionary changes have overtaken the Ameri-
can law of products liability. Such changes have been in response to the
increase in consumer injuries resulting from defects in sophisticated prod-
ucts mass-produced by sophisticated manufacturing processes. This has
occurred during a time of increased litigiousness and general awareness of
the need for consumer protection.' Accordingly, products liability suits
have multiplied,2 and the legal theories used to determine the outcome of
such suits have similarly been in an era of dramatic transition. Such legal
changes have significantly affected both tort and warranty law across the
* The student contributors are John P. Rowley Il and Sally Y. Wood. They, express their
appreciation for the guidance and support of Professor Robert I. Stephenson without which
this note could not have been written.
1. Emroch, Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: One Hundred Years of Products Liability
Law, 4 U. RcH. L. Rav. 155, 155 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Emroch, Caveat Emptor].
2. Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317,
319 (1978-79).
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country. Until 1960 products liability suits were brought primarily in war-
ranty or negligence. Today, strict tort liability has become established as
a powerful legal doctrine.3
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.4 first considered this tort the-
ory that merely requires proof of a defect and no showing of defendant's
negligence. Policy reasons such as risk spreading, consumer protection,
safety incentives, enterprise liability and the balancing of utility and risk
justify this doctrine's emergence.5 The marketing policy described by the
American Law Institute best summarizes, however, the need for strict tort
liability.
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said
to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to
and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
3. Id. at 335-36. In 1961, the American Law Institute submitted the first draft of 402A
which limited its scope to the sale of food. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). However, the laws
concerning strict tort liability were changing so rapidly that in 1962, 402A was redrafted to
include products for "intimate bodily use." (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). In 1964, this section
would be redrafted to include "any product." (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rav. 791, 793, n.9 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Prosser, The Fall]. For a discussion of strict tort liability, see Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967 & Supp. 1979).
4. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Plaintiff's wife purchased a power
tool. While plaintiff was using this tool as a lathe, a piece of wood flew from it, striking and
injuring the plaintiff. In sustaining the trial court's judgment against the manufacturer, Jus-
tice Traynor emphasized that establishment of an express warranty in order to impose strict
liability was unnecessary. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being." 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. For
studies of strict tort liability's historical development, see Kessler, Products Liability, 76
YALE L. J. 887, 895-938 (1967); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The
Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 30 (1965); Maleson, Negligence Is Dead
but Its Doctrines Rule Us from the Grave: A Proposal to Limit Defendants' Responsibility in
Strict Products Liability Actions Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L. Q. 1, 5-12
(1978).
5. See Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1189-91 (1976); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1119-24 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The As-
sault]; Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1371-88 (1974); Speidel,
The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 804, 809-13 (1965); Note, Reforming the Law of Consumer Recov-
ery and Enterprise Liability Through the Uniform Commercial Code, 60 VA. L. Rv. 1013,
1019-22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reforming the Law].
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goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is enti-
tled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.6
A study of such policy concerns and of case precedent culminated in
the Institute's adoption of section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts. That section defines the seller's liability when his defective product
causes harm to a user or consumer as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.8
It was maintained that strict liability should sound in tort rather than in
an implied warranty action.' Additionally 402A was espoused since con-
tractual limitations encumbered the warranty action. Of particular con-
cem were the restrictions dealing with privity, notice and disclaimer.'"
Simply expressed, "[t]he remedies of injured consumers ought not .. to
depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.""
While heralded for its legal simplicity, 2 402A in substance is not signifi-
cantly different from modem warranty law-at least in Virginia. The
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment b (1965).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 402A (1965).
9. Comment, 41 TENN. L. Rav. 756, 757-58 (1974).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment m (1965). Privity of contract re-
stricts warranty rights to purchasers of the warranted goods. Notice bars any warranty re-
covery unless the warrantor is given prompt notice of the warranty breach. A disclaimer
provision in a seller's standardized sales contract customarily excludes (often in small print)
the implied warranty of merchantability.
11. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
12. "Its main appeal is that it appears to be a tidier piece of legal doctrine than its prede-
cessors." Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TEN. L. Rav. 439, 442 (1969).
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
drafters of 402A did not, however, rely heavily on warranty precedent to
formulate its strict tort liability principles. 3 Moreover all 402A "does to
implied warranty law is abolish the notice requirement, restrict the effec-
tiveness of disclaimers to situations where it can be reasonably said that
the consumer has freely assumed the risk, and abolish the privity require-
ment, where ordinary consumers are involved.""
Although 402A has not been embraced by some scholars,'5 the over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions have adopted 402A,'" or
some variation of its formula." A few states have legislatively adopted
this doctrine; most jurisdictions, however, have judicially enacted 402A.18
II. REviEw OF 402A
Illustrative of 402A's reform is its abrogation of a "privify of contract"19
requirement which was an anachronism in tort law. Section 402A applies
although "the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller."2 Dean Prosser noted
the policy reason for this anti-privity approach. The supplier, marketing
his product through packaging, advertising and the like, represents to the
public that his product is serviceable and safe. Thus in reliance, the con-
sumer purchases the product. A middleman serves only to get the product
to the consumer. Therefore, when the product injures the consumer, the
supplier reasonably and fairly cannot escape liability by arguing lack of
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment b (1965).
14. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 30 (1965).
See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 3, at 804. However, the American Law Institute did intend
402A to sound in tort and not in contract law. Id. at 802. Even if the word "warranty" is
used in conjunction with 402A, it "must be given a new and different meaning if it is to be
used in connection with this Section." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m
(1965).
15. See Speidel, supra note 5, at 804; Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 713 (1970).
16. As of 1978, thirty-eight states had adopted either 402A or some variation of its
formula. Maleson, supra note 4, at 2.
17. A few courts have not required proof that the defect be "unreasonably dangerous";
some hold only the defendant-manufacturer liable; others restrict liability, in cases involving
property damage, to property other than to the product itself. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note
2, at 336-40.
18. Of the thirty-eight states only Arkansas, Maine and South Carolina have codified
402A. Id. at 336, n.86.
19. Privity of Contract is defined as: "that connection or relationship which exists be-
tween two or more contracting parties. It was traditionally essential to the maintenance of
an action on any contract that there should subsist such privity between the plaintiff and
defendant in respect of the matter sued on." BLACK'S LAw DicrONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
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privity.2 ' The Restatement's abrogation of privity reflected developing
case law that advocated such change.2
The Restatement remained neutral as to the bystander's status. 2 A ca-
veat of 402A noted that "[tihe Institute expresses no opinion as to
whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply . . . to harm to
persons other than users or consumers .... ,,2" However, 402A's silence
was not intended to restrict bystander recovery since "[t]he caveat articu-
lates the essential point: once strict tort liability is accepted, bystander
recovery is analytically fait accompli.'" Thus, courts logically extended
402A to include the innocent bystander;2 certainly this extension has re-
21. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1123. For additional reasons see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402:, Comment c (1965); Dickerson, supra note 12, at 445-47; Kessler,
supra note 4, at 891-92; Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64
CORNELL L. REv. 30, 255-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Article Two Warranties].
22. A historical study of the privity issue begins with Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &
W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). An injured driver of a defective mail coach was unable to
recover damages in warranty from the retailer because no contractual relationship existed
between them. Winterbottom was thereafter treated as if it had been a negligence action. As
such, its "doctrine" would prevail throughout the 19th century in America. See 2 R. HUSH
& H. BAILEY, AMERIcAN LAw OF PRODUCrS L#BmrY § 10:2 (2d ed. 1974). However, Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), held privity not required in a negligence action resulting from
mislabeling of something inherently dangerous: viz., a poison. Exception upon exception
would erode Winterbottom, and its ruling was finally rejected by MacPherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). An automobile manufacturer's defective wheel
caused plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff was allowed to recover notwithstanding lack of priv-
ity. MacPherson, now universally followed, held defendant liable for negligently marketing a
product which placed the consumer in danger. See R. HunSH & H. BAiLY at § 10:36; W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ToRTr § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
In warranty actions, anti-privity doctrines were first held applicable only to cases involv-
ing unwholesome food and drink. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1103-14. How-
ever, in Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the court
allowed recovery against the remote manufacturer of a defective automobile as well. There-
fore, the nature of the product became irrelevant. See generally 63 AM. Jun. 2D Products
Liability § 159-72 (1972); Phillips, supra note 2, at 377-81.
23. The bystander, for instance, is a person who is hurt by a defective product that he
neither owns nor is using. He is, for example, a person injured by the bolt that flies from the
defective lawnmower or a pedestrian hit by the defective automobile that steers out of con-
trol. "His only misfortune is being in the wrong place at the wrong time, much the same as
the unlucky victim of a lightning bolt." Comment, 19 KAN. L. REv. 251, 251 (1971).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TomS § 402A, Caveat (1965). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Toms § 402A, Comment o (1965).
25. Comment, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 630 (1971). Contra, Speidel, supra note 5, at 819.
26. In interpreting and expanding 402A, Elmore v. American Motors Corp. explained that
"[clonsumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit
their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable
retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunites. In short, the bystander
is in greater need of protection." 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657
19801
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flected the trend.Y Since 402A lies in tort and not in contract, there is no
discernable reason why anti-privity principles should extend to both the
user and consumer and not the bystander.Y
Section 402A's liability is strict since defendant's negligence need not
be proven. Defendant is liable even though he "has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product, '29 and the plaintiff need
not prove that the defendant "failed to exercise due care in making the
defective article or in failing to discover a defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous product."3 A plaintiff's frequent inability to show negligence justi-
fies the imposition of strict liability." Moreover, the desire to place re-
sponsibility upon manufacturers and distributors for placing defective
products on the market supports this reasoning.2 A strict tort liability
action thus avoids the expense of time and money normally required in a
negligence action,33 since 402A's roots are not based in negligence.34
Logically, 402A eliminated the defense of contributory negligence,5 and
the vast majority of courts adopting section 402A have so held." At least,
"[clontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such neg-
ligence consists merely of a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence."3 This defense is abol-
ished since the manufacturer or distributor has affirmed his goods to be
safe, and "[tihe force of this affirmation would be materially lessened if
he were held to make this affirmation only to careful persons."" However,
assumption of risk remains a defense in a strict tort liability suit; there-
fore "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known dan-
(1969). Additionally, the extension is justified since the cost of consumer injuries can best be
assumed by the manufacturer who passes this expense along to its purchasers. Codling v.
Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973). See generally
63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 144 (1972).
27. Reforming the Law, supra note 5, at 1017.
28. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 402A, Comment 1 (1965).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(2) (1965).
30. Emroch, Pleading and Proof in a Products Liability Case, 3 VA. BAR A. J. 5, 8 (1977).
31. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944); Phil-
lips, supra note 2, at 337; Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1117; 63 AM. JuR. 2D Prod-
ucts Liability § 125 (1972).
32. Emroch, Pleading and Proof, supra note 30, at 8.
33. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1116.
34. Maleson, supra note 4, at 5-12.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
36. Seidelson, The 402A Defendant and the Negligent Actor, 15 DuQ. L. Rnv. 371, 373,
n.13 (1977).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
38. Lascher, supra note 4, at 53-54. Consequently the consumer can rely on this represen-
tation of safety. Green, supra note 5, at 1215.
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ger" constitutes a defense. 9
While negligence need not be proven, the existence of a defect must be
shown.10 "Unreasonably dangerous" serves as the 402A standard for estab-
lishing a defect." Some jurisdictions, while otherwise adopting 402A, have
not countenanced this language because it has been determined that "un-
reasonably" smacks too much of negligence." Certainly it is a more de-
manding standard than that imposed in warranty.43 Because "unreasona-
bly dangerous" affords judicial control, in proper instances the case will
not reach a plaintiff-oriented jury. Importantly, once the case does reach
the jury, "unreasonably dangerous" provides an easily understood stan-
dard for determining whether the product is defective.
Some courts have interpreted 402A to extend to the housing industry.
Such reasoning is logical since 402A does hold the seller liable for "any
product" placed on the market that is defective and causes injury.44 When
considering mass-developed housing, these courts have been unable to
distinguish the house from any other mass-produced product. "Common
sense tells us that a purchaser under these circumstances should have at
least as much protection as the purchaser of a new car, or a gas stove, or a
sump pump, or a ladder."45 Certainly the trend is to extend 402A's cover-
age to mass-produced homes that result in personal injuries because they
are defectively constructed.4" "Caveat emptor" should no longer prevail,"
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRm § 402A, Comment n (1965). See generally Keeton,
Assumption of Products Risks, 19 S.W.L.J. 61 (1965); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal
Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972).
40. Emroch, Pleading and Proof, supra note 30, at 5. See 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liabil-
ity § 129 (1972).
41. Emroch, Pleading and Proof, supra note 30, at 13.
42. In some jurisdictions the plaintiff need not show that the product was "unreasonably
dangerous." Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213-14
(Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d
562, 564 (1973). Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978),
found "unreasonably dangerous" misleading to the jury. In West Virginia, the test is
whether the product is reasonably safe for its intended use. Morningstar v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., - W. Va. _, 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (1979).
43. Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Pro-
tection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567, 599 (1975). Contra, Dickerson, supra note 12, at 443.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(1) (1965). § 402A should encompass housing
since "[ilt extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition,
in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToTS § 402A, Comment d (1965).
45. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972). See, e.g., Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969).
46. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), serves as the forerun-
ner of cases allowing 402A protection of mass-produced homes. Lessee of such a mass-pro-
1980]
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and the previously unprotected homeowner must be afforded greater con-
sumer protection." In sporadic instances judicial decisions have expanded
402A's coverage to real estate transactions outside the area of mass-pro-
duced homes. 4 However, it is not inconceivable that 402A will afford
homeowners the broad protection that has been long awaited."0
Most importantly, 402A was founded in tort and thus escaped the con-
tractual limitations of disclaimer and notice. Both contract limitations
had been sanctioned by the Sales Act' and the Uniform Commercial
duced home recovered against the builder-vendor under a strict liability in tort doctrine
when scalding faucet water severely burned lessee's child. See Jaeger, An Emerging Con-
cept: Consumer Protection in Statutory Regulation, Products Liability and the Sale of New
Homes, 11 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 343-45 (1977); Maldonado, Builder Beware: Strict Tort Lia-
bility for Mass-Produced Housing, 7 RmA EsTATE L. J. 283, 294-97 (1979); Rapson, Products
Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692, 694-95 (1965). Berman v. Watergate West
Inc., 391 A.2d 1351, 1356 (D.C. 1978), and Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379
A.2d 297, 298 (1977), have applied 402A to such real estate transactions. Imposition of strict
tort liability is a definite trend. Maldonado, supra at 297. See generally Annot. 25 A.L.R.3d
383 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
47. Such a harsh rule should not prevail since the purchase of a home is normally the
largest purchase in the consumer's life. "Caveat emptor" is anachronistic in the mass-pro-
duced housing area; today the builder-vendor and the buyer are hardly in equal bargaining
positions. The buyer today is forced to rely on the seller's skills and representations. See,
e.g., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAN.
L. Rav. 541 (1961); Comment, 13 U. RIcH. L. Rav. 381, 381-85 (1979).
48. Intricate building codes obstructed the homeowner's ability to reach the builder-ven-
dor. Additionally warranty theories offered little homeowner-consumer protection. Maldo-
nado, supra note 46, at 283. Moreover, such mass-produced homes are normally purchased
by lower to middle income-bracket consumers.
49. Strict tort liability has been extended to defective home component parts. State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113 (1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
Additionally, in Avner v. Longridge Ests., 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969), the
court held defendant liable for the iinproper grading of a landfill which caused a slope of the
lot to collapse. Avner involved neither mass-production of homes nor industrial products.
See Maldonado, supra note 46, at 297-98; Comment, 45 NoTmr DAME LAW. 533, 535 (1970).
50. Time will tell whether the doctrine applies to the sale of a new non-development
house, or to the resale of a 'used' development house (where the developer takes a
deed back from the original purchaser), or even to the sale of a 'used' non-develop-
ment house (i.e., not involving any builders).
Rapson, supra note 46, at 695, n.15.
51. Section 71 of the Sales Act sanctioned disclaimers; Section 49 sanctioned notice re-
quirements. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1130-32. Disclaimers traditionally had
been allowed based on freedom of contract principles. Whitford, Strict Products Liability
and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. Rav. 83, 96. Notice
was required in order to prevent stale claims and to allow defendant's earliest investigation
of the claim. Having been notified of injury, the defendant could remove his product from
the market, thus preventing further injuries. Phillips, supra note 2, at 376; Reforming the
Law, supra note 5, at 1034-35.
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Code,5 2 but not without harsh criticism. 53 Section 402A emphasizes that
these sales law intricacies are totally inapplicable when determining lia-
bility for a defective product that causes injury to the consumer.5' As
Dean Prosser stated:
What all of this adds up to is that "warranty," as a device for the justifi-
cation of strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in the
way of undesirable complications, and is leading us down a very thorny
path. The courts which quote, in nearly every other case, the statement that
"the remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon
the intricacies of the law of sales," have proceeded to entangle themselves in
precisely those intricacies like Laocoon and his sons.5
III. THE CASE OF THE EXPLODING LAWNMOWER REVISITED
In 1964, the General Assembly enacted Virginia's version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.5" Dean Richard Speidel, in the succeeding year,
52. Disclaimers are allowed by the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1972 ver-
sion). Both express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability can be disclaimed,
but the disclaimer must be conspicuous. '"hat is to say, they cannot be disclaimed in fine
print that does not fairly apprise the buyer of the risk he is running. They should be dis-
claimed conspicuously, in language that fairly apprises the buyer of the facts." Hawkland,
Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales
Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAW. 73, 89 (1964), quoted in Rapson, supra note 46, at 710. See Article
Two Warranties, supra note 21, at 170-91; Whitford, supra note 51, at 101-02.
Notice is required by the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1972 version).
See U.C.C. § 2-607, comments 4 and 5 (1972 version); Article Two Warranties, supra note
21, at 265; Rapson, supra note 46, at 707-09; Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966 & Supp. 1979);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 270 (1957).
53. For instance, disclaimers are criticized because the seller retains too much power. It is
unfair for the manufacturer-distributor to disclaim liability when he is best able to absorb
the loss. Furthermore, in the consumer setting, freedom of contract principles are totally
inapplicable; overreaching could easily characterize such transactions. See, e.g., Franklin,
When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18
STAN. L. Rzv. 974, at 1004-12 (1966); Phillips, supra note 2, at 382; Prosser, The Assault,
supra note 5, at 1131-33. Contra, McCauley, Private Legislation and the Duty to
Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L.
Rzv. 1051 (1966).
It is urged that notice requirements are unreasonable since the buyer would not think to
give notice to a party with whom he has had no dealings. Additionally, the consumer should
not be expected to know of the business practice that requires notice of injuries or damages.
A remote defendant, moreover, might not easily be located by the consumer. See, e.g.,
Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 56, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965); James,
Products Liability, 34 Tzx. L. REv. 192, 196-98 (1955); Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at
1130.
54. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
55. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1133-34.
56. VA. CODE ANN. Titles 8.1-8.10 (Added Vol. 1965).
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wrote of the difference between the U.C.C.'s strict warranty liability and
the strict tort liability of 402A. 57 Dean Speidel additionally argued at that
time that Virginia should limit any strict liability action to that defined
under the U.C.C. He argued that the U.C.C. was prefereable, for it offered
broader product liability protection than that afforded by the then re-
cently promulgated 402A. 8
Approximately fifteen years have passed since the publication of Dean
Speidel's article. Today 402A's full expanse has been clarified by judicial
interpretation. Clearly 402A affords fuller protection than that provided
under the U.C.C.; moreover, 402A clearly affords solutions and a simplic-
ity that the U.C.C. alone cannot achieve. Therefore today contrary to
Dean Speidel's earlier suggestion,5" both the strict warranty principles of
the U.C.C. and the strict tort principles of 402A are needed in order to
provide greater legal flexibility in the products liability field. Because
flexibility is desired, 402A should be judicially embraced in Virginia. Leg-
islative adoption, on the other hand, would likely serve only to restrict the
scope of this strict tort doctrine.
In order to give support to the above recommendations, the hypotheti-
cal problem set out in the Speidel article will serve as a basis for study
and comparison. Dean Speidel posed the problem as follows:
M, a medium-sized business concern, is engaged in the manufacture of
rotary blades for power lawnmowers. The blades are produced in a modem
plant and are designed to last through at least 200 hours of normal use.
Most of A's business is derived from special orders by favored customers.
On January 5, M sold and delivered to A, a manufacturer of lawn and gar-
den equipment, 250 specially manufactured rotary blades of various sizes.
One of these blades contained an inherent structural weakness which was
not discovered by M during routine pre-delivery testing. A, upon receiving
the blades, conducted a visual examination of each and assembled them
with other components injo completed power mowers. Each finished mower
was then subjected to and passed a thirty minute operating test. On Febru-
ary 1, A initiated a nationwide advertising campaign to promote the sale of
its power mowers. About the same time, A sold 50 power mowers under its
brand, including the mower with the defective blade, to J, a jobber. Without
further inspection, J sold the defective mower in a lot of 15 to R, a large
retailer of garden and lawn supplies who handled many different brands. R
conducted a visual examination of each mower and performed prescribed
maintenance without discovering anything unusual. On March 15, R sold
the power lawnmower with the defective blade to P, a homeowner. P care-
57. Speidel, supra note 5, at 804.
58. Id. at 852.
59. Id. at 818.
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fully followed the operator's manual prepared by A and put the lawnmower
into use. On April 1, after 10 hours of normal operation, U, P's 16-year-old
son, and B, a next door neighbor, attempted to start the mower to commence
the weekly lawn mowing chore. Immediately after the lawnmower started,
the rotary blade snapped and cut upwards with terrific force through the
protective shield and into the gas tank. The resulting explosion destroyed the
lawnmower and seriously injured both U and B.1°
A. Abrogation of Privity
Section 402A has been interpreted to provide the same broad range of
personal injury protection as does Virginia's version of the U.C.C. Since
Virginia's enactment of the anti-privity statute,6 ' all three plaintiffs in the
hypothetical can recover. They can at least recover damages from the
retailer R if they can show a warranty has been breached. Therefore, under
Virginia's version of the U.C.C.,6" P can recover for his personal property
60. Id. at 808-09.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964), which was originally placed in Title 8 concerning
"Civil Remedies and Procedure," reversed Virginia's law that had required privity in certain
breach of warranty cases. Before the enactment of this statute, no privity was required in a
warranty action involving unwholesome food or beverage. It made no difference if the food
was purchased in a sealed container. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 221, 110 S.E.2d 203,
208-09 (1959). Public policy demanded that the health and life of consumers be protected.
Additionally, the manufacturer-seller was considered better situated to prevent the distribu-
tion of such unwholesome products. Swift emphasized that defendant's advertising encour-
aged the public to buy, consume and serve these food products. See Dickerson, supra note
12, at 442; Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability
Cases, 48 VA. L. REV. 982, 982-83 (1962). However, privity was a defense in nonfood or
beverage warranty cases. In Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958,
121 S.E.2d 471, (1961), the plaintiff was injured by a defective crane sold to his employer by
the defendant-dealer. Plaintiff's evidence was stricken since no privity existed between the
defendant and him. Id. at 963, 121 S.E.2d at 474. See generally, Comment, 27 Mo. L. REv.
194 (1962). Virginia also had required privity in negligence actions, General Bronze Corp. v.
Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 69, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1961), although Virginia had recognized that
privity was not required if the product was "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous. Id..at
70, 122 S.E.2d at 551; Robey v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 192 Va. 192, 196-
97, 64 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1951). Another exception was carved out for negligence actions con-
cerning food or beverage. In Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krause, 162 Va. 107,
113, 173 S.E. 497, 498 (1934), the defendant bottling company was held liable to plaintiff who
suffered injuries after swallowing glass contained in a Coke bottle. See generally, Emroch,
Elimination of Privity, supra note 61, at 982-84.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964) was repealed and substituted without major
change by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965) which states that:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of
warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase
the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or
seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods
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loss. U, the user, and B, the bystander, can recover for their personal
injuries. Unlike the official U.C.C.,3 Virginia's section 8.2-318 allows all
three to recover since the manufacturer-seller should have reasonably fore-
seen that they all would somehow be affected by the product. Importantly,
this anti-privity statute permits the bystander to recover since he could
just as foreseeably be affected by defective goods." As Dean Speidel em-
phasized, Virginia's section 8.2-318 was progressive; this statute afforded
bystander protection without having to wait for case law to develop and
afford comparable protection." Except in a rare instance," Virginia's
U.C.C. reaches any defendant who made a warranty and is within the
distributive chain. 7 Therefore Virginia has eliminated privity as a defense
in a products liability action whether the action is brought in tort or war-
ranty, implied or expressed."
63. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1952 version) did not abolish vertical privity. However, horizontal
privity was abolished since this section extended its protection to the family, household or
guest. Given the facts of the lawnmower hypothetical, the Official Text only allows U to sue
and R to be sued. Speidel, supra note 5, at 815. However, Comment 3 emphasizes that "the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether
the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distribu-
tive chains." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1972 version) suggests three alternative versions for state adop-
tion.
64. Speidel, supra note 5, at 819-20.
65. Id. at 820, n.39.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965) does not affect the architect. Any warranty
made by the architect for his designs and his construction supervision runs only to his
employer. Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1977). When a
statutory violation is involved, it is unnecessary to rely on Virginia's anti-privity statute.
Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960).
67. Consider that M, the manufacturer of the defective blade, either impliedly or expressly
warranted the blade when selling it toA, the mower manufacturer. Then when the latter sold
the assembled mowers to J, the jobber, the sale presumably transferred to the jobber the
original warranty. When the jobber resold to R, the retailer, it seems reasonable that M's
warranty would again be transferred and that it was finally transferred by the retailer to P,
the ultimate consumer. Then by reason of Virginia's version of § 2-318, the injured U and R
can recover from the manufacturer of the defective blade. This approach certainly appears
convoluted when compared with the relative ease of 402A.
68. However, it has been argued that privity should remain a defense in a U.C.C. warranty
action. The action becomes "a hybrid form of action without a firm basis in either contract
or tort law. This would prevent the uniformity of application which the Uniform Code tries
to achieve." Comment, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 143, 149, n.31 (1969). It is no more consistent
that the bystander recover under warranty law. "The implied warranty is conceptually re-
lated to the contract of sales; therefore the bystander is beyond its scope-he is not the buyer
of the product, nor is he within its chain of distribution, nor has he relied on any warranty."
Comment, 38 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 25, at 630. The extension is made no more logical
by considering the bystander a third party beneficiary since the buyer-seller contract is not
made with an outside party's benefit in mind. Id. at 631.
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Dean Speidel had determined that U, the ultimate user, was protected
under 402A;11 clearly this section extends to "physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user."7 U can recover since 402A is based in tort
and no contractual relationship is required between U and the defen-
dants."
However Dean Speidel questioned that P, the purchaser, either as an
"ultimate consumer" or as a "bystander" could recover damages for his
destroyed lawnmower . 2 To reach this conclusion, however, the focus
should have been that P wanted compensation for economic loss alone.
Incorrectly Dean Speidel noted that "the type of damage sustained by P
is under section 402A."73 In actuality, defendant's liability under 402A "for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property"7 has rarely been interpreted to extend to economic loss of the
product. Instead, 402A has typically been interpreted to allow recovery
only for physical injury or for damage to property other than the product
itself." It is considered that the product's destruction alone does not give
rise to an "unreasonably dangerous" defect. "[Tihe term 'unreasonably
dangerous,' as used in Section 402A as the basis for the imposition of strict
liability, without proof of negligence, was not intended to be so 'watered
down' as to extend to any defect which in any way may decrease the value
of property."76 This inability to recover for economic loss alone distin-
guishes tort and contract actions.77 Therefore P is left to his contractual
remedies, if any, in order to recover damages for the destroyed lawnmower.
In Virginia he would rely on the breach of warranty sections of the U.C.C."
Dean Speidel determined that the bystander was unprotected under
402A. 9 However, approximately fifteen years after his article, it is clear
69. Speidel, supra note 5, at 819.
70. RSTATEMrENT (SE cOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment 1 (1965).
72. Speidel, supra note 5, at 819.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TomRS § 402A(1) (1965).
75. See, e.g., Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 447, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113,
116 (1972). Contra, John R. Dubley Const., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D. 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d
512, 513 (1979), wherein the only damage was to a crane purchased by the plaintiff from the
manufacturer. See also, Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966),
where the court, in expanding 402A's coverage, relied on concepts of misrepresentation as
enumerated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
76. Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537, 542 (1974).
77. See, e.g., Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d
100, 103 (1977).
78. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-313 to 315 (Added Vol. 1965).
79. Speidel, supra note 5, at 819.
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that judicial decisions have interpreted 402A to extend to the bystander."0
Therefore the bystander, as suggested, need "not. . .wait for developing
case law to obtain some legal protection.""1 Today B can recover damages
under 402A for personal injuries caused by the defective lawn mower.
B. Negligence and Contributory Negligence
Of course, under Virginia's U.C.C. and 402A alike, plaintiff need not
prove the defendant negligent in order to recover.82 Historically in Virginia,
negligence had not been an element in a breach of warranty action. 3 Ob-
viously it is preferable for plaintiff to bring his suit in strict tort or war-
ranty. 4 The obstacles involved in a negligence action, for instance, are
illustrated by Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.88 In this exploding
stove case, the inability to submit adequate proof of negligence prevented
plaintiff's recovery. Because the allegedly defective stove was destroyed,
expert testimony concerning a possible defect was lacking. Consequently,
plaintiff could neither directly nor inferentially prove negligence. The ex-
plosion alone did not show negligence since intervening causes or third
parties could have caused the defect. Since such an accident could have
been attributable to other sources, the "doctrine of res ipsa loquitur" was
of no assistance.8 7
Dean Speidel maintained that contributory negligence or something
80. See notes 25-27, supra, and accompanying text.
81. Speidel, supra note 5, at 820.
82. Rapson, supra note 46, at 699. See generally, 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 91
(1972).
83. Negligence is not an element in a breach of warranty action since, historically, warranty
has been "consistently regarded as an action ex contractu." Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc.,
206 Va. 457, 463, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965). It made no difference whether the warranty was
express or implied. Gerst v. Jones & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 518, 524 (1879). However, at one
time in Virginia, plaintiff could not recover unless it was proven that defendant knowingly
sold a defective product. Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 448, 456, 134 S.E. 588, 591 (1926).
But under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314, the outcome of Belcher should be changed; the fact that
defendant did not know of the latent defect should not prevent the plaintiff's recovery. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-314, Virginia comment (1965).
84. See Emroch, Pleading and Proof, supra note 30, at 9.
85. "The principle obstacle to recovery, generally speaking, on a negligence theory, is not
the substantive law as to duty or causation, but the unavailability of sufficient evidence of
negligence to have the case submitted to the jury." Keton, Products Liability-Proof of the
Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675, 676 (1963). See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault,
supra note 5, at 1114-19.
86. 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975).
87. Id. at 429, 219 S.E.2d at 689. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Yeatts, 207 Va. 534, 538,
151 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1966); Peters v. Lynchburg, etc., Light Co., 108 Va. 333, 336, 61 S.E.
745, 746 (1908). See generally, S. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR (1972).
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that "resembles contributory negligence" is a defense under Virginia's
version of the U.C.C. 5 Speidel held this to be true even after having as-
serted that negligence was not a prerequisite to recovery under the Code.89
Therefore, according to Dean Speidel, 402A and the U.C.C. differ since
under the Restatement, contributory negligence is no defense. The differ-
ence is significant since a contributory negligence defense "give[s] the
defendant more room to avoid strict liability."91
However, Dean Speidel was incorrect. The U.C.C. is silent as to the
defense of contributory negligence.2 A closer analysis of the Speidel article
illustrates only that the two actions are similar - under 402A and the
Virginia U.C.C. both a defect and proximate cause must be proven.
Contributory negligence is no defense under Virginia's version of the
U.C.C 4 In Brockett v. Harrel Bros. Inc.," an implied warranty of fitness
action, the Virginia Supreme Court stated: "The majority view is that
since the action is ex contractu, contributory negligence as a defense has
no place therein . . . . We adopt the majority view since that is more in
accord with our concept of the nature of the action."98 However, the de-
fense of assumption of risk, wherein the plaintiff is deemed to be the sole
proximate cause of his own injury, can be raised in negligence, warranty
and strict tort actions. 7 Brockett illustrates the difference between contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk. Mrs. Brockett was not barred
from recovering for a broken tooth because she failed to discover "buck-
shot" embedded in the ham. Therefore failure to discover the danger or to
take precautions against possible dangers does not preclude recovery.
However, had she seen the "buckshot" in the ham but consumed it never-
theless, she would not have recovered since she would have been deemed
88. Speidel, supra note 5, at 833.
89. Id.
90. See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
91. Speidel, supra note 5, at 834.
92. Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993, 999 (1977). Rapson, supra note 46, at
698-704.
93. Dean Speidel's references to section 2-715, comment 5 and section 2-314, comment 13,
do not indicate that contributory negligence is a defense; these comments only emphasize
plaintiff's need to prove proximate cause in order to recover for injuries resulting from a
breach of warranty. Additionally, section 2-316(3)(b) does not support his argument since it
addresses only the question of disclaimers of warranties. Speidel, supra note 5, at 833-34. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-715, official comment 5; § 8.2-314, official comment 13; § 8.2-316(3)(b)
(Added Vol. 1965).
94. Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 401, n.1 (4th Cir. 1973).
95. 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
96. Id. at 462, 143 S.E.2d at 902.
97. Emroch, Pleading and Proof, supra note 30, at 9. See generally, Noel, supra note 39,
at 93; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965 & Supp. 1979).
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to have assumed the risk. The court explained that "[t]his is so because
the presumption is that the plaintiff contracted to buy the food product
in its obvious or known condition.""8 Query: If U had observed gasoline
gushing from the lawn mower and had lit a cigarette, would he be able to
recover damages for his personal injuries caused by the ensuing explosion?
C. Statute of Limitations
Another area of consistency between section 402A and the U.C.C. in
Virginia is the length of the period in which a personal injury suit may be
brought. Until Tyler v. Street," no court had had an opportunity to decide
whether the controlling statute of limitations for a personal injury claim
was the two-year statute governing actions arising in tort"'t or the four-year
statute of the U.C.C.'1'
In Tyler, a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based its decision on Friedman
v. Peoples Service Drug Stores, Inc.,'" and held that the two year statute
applies not only to tort actions but to every action for personal injuries
whether based in contract or tort.03 Since a cause of action arising in tort
98. 206 Va. at 463, 143 S.E.2d at 902. See Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 273, n.44 (1977); Curtis, Contracts and Sale, 53 VA. L. REv. 181,
187-88 (1967).
99. 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1954))
provides: "A. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every action for personal injuries, what-
ever the theory of recovery, except as provided in B [Every action for property shall be
brought within five years hereof], shall be brought within two years next after the cause of
action shall have accrued."
101. U.C.C § 2-725 provides in relevant part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
102. 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968). In Friedman, an action arising before the effective
date of the U.C.C., plaintiff sued for injuries sustained through defendant's alleged failure
to properly fill plaintiff's prescription for medicine. Plaintiff admitted his action for personal
injuries was barred in tort due to the running of the statutory period. He contended, alter-
nately, that Virginia's three year statute of limitations for contracts should apply. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's contention and held that the two-year statute applies
to every action for personal injuries, whether based upon tort or contract.
103. 322 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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does not accrue until the time of injury,' 4 rather than upon delivery of
defective goods,' 5 application of the two year limitation period facilitates
consumer protection.'
IV. WHY STRICT LIABILITIES IN TORT?
The rule stated in this Section [402A] is not governed by the provisions
•.. of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected
by the scope and content of warranties .... Nor is the consumer required
to give notice to the seller of his injury. .... The consumer's cause of action
• . . is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. . . . It is much
simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability in
tort.107
Although the U.C.C. provides considerable protection for the consumer
injured by a defective product in Virginia, its "hybrid"'' 0 character pres-
ents problems which have no justifiable place in personal injury litigation.
Dean Speidel recognized the existence of obstacles to warranty recovery
for personal injury. ' However, these obstacles are potentially more
burdensome to the consumer-plaintiff than indicated by the "Case of the
Exploding Lawnmower."" s The contractual limitations on warranty liabil-
ity alone should be sufficient to usher the doctrine of strict liability in tort
into Virginia.
After noting that the American Law Institute has unequivocally stated
that the intracacies of sales law, such as notice and disclaimer of liability,
are irrelevant in a personal injury suit,"' Dean Speidel concludes that
these obstacles pose no substantial threat to consumer protection under
warranty theory.12 This thesis was debatable at the time it was made, as
demonstrated by the number of jurisdictions that adopted section 402A or
some variation thereof."' It finds much less justification today in view of
104. See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969) (personal injury
cause of action resulting from defective automobile accrued at time of injury and not at the
alleged breach of warranty).
105. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
106. This conclusion is not, of course, universally endorsed. See, e.g., 6 U. RICH. L. REv.
182, 188 (1971) where the author argues that the statute of limitations for contract is more
desirable since the tort statute, in a breach of warranty action for personal injury, extends a
seller's or manufacturer's potential period of liability for an indefinite length of time.
107. 'RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
108. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1126.
109. Speidel, supra note 5, at 834-38.
110. Id. at 808-09.
111. Id. at 834.
112. Id. at 834-38.
113. See supra note 16.
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the growth and continued flexibility of the doctrine.
A. Warranties of Quality
Warranty theory in products liability is based upon the seller's guaran-
tee, express or implied, that the product, if not misused, is of suitable
quality for use."4 Originally under common law, a seller was bound only
by express words of warranty with respect to quality."' Gradually, during
the early nineteenth century, implied warranties evolved and today they
are codified in the U.C.C.1"
The primary implied warranty is the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity provided by section 2-314."11 This warranty resembles section 402A and
shares three basic requirements for recovery." 8 Under both sections, a
consumer-plaintiff must prove that the goods purchased from the
merchant-defendant"' were defective, 2 ' thereby proximately causing in-
jury to his person or property.
The other implied warranty available to the consumer is the implied
114. See, e.g., Smith v. Hensley, 202 Va. 700, 119 S.E.2d 332 (1961); McNeir v. Greer-Hale
Chinchilla Ranch, 194 Va. 623, 74 S.E.2d 165 (1953); Charles Syer & Co. v. Lester, 116 Va.
541, 82 S.E. 122 (1914).
115. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Exch. 1603).
116. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
117. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
118. Speidel, supra note 5, at 825, n.53 and accompanying text.
119. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) provides that a warranty of merchantability will be implied,
unless excluded or modified, "if the seller is a merchant."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(l)(a) (1965) provides that the section can be
applied if "the seller is engaged in the business of selling such products."
120. Most commentators agree that § 2-314's "unmerchantable" standard and 402A's
"unreasonably dangerous" standard for determining defectiveness are, for all practical pur-
poses, equivalent.
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warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.' 1 Although, in practice, it does
not apply nearly as often as the implied warranty of merchantability,12 it
has been important in recent cases involving Virginia plaintiffs.'2 When
relying on this warranty, a plaintiff has the burden of proving reliance on
the seller's expertise while selecting a product, and also that the seller had
actual or constructive knowledge of the buyer's intended use of the prod-
uct.
12
In addition to these implied warranties, the consumer also has the bene-
fit of express warranties made by the seller which "relates to the goods and
becomes a part of the basis of the bargain"1 irrespective of the intention
of the seller.' 6 However, to be considered a valid express warranty, a state-
ment must be more than the seller's recommendation or opinion of qual-
121. U.C.C. § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
122. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 572.
123. See, e.g., Mathews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973) (automobile
unexpectantly shifting into reverse due to mechanical defect); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc.,
206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965) (buckshot embedded in a ham processed and packed by
defendant).
124. U.C.C. § 2-315, supra note 121; U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1. See, e.g., Layne-Atlantic
Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 201 S.E.2d 609 (1974).
125. U.C.C. § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make
a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purport-
ing to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.
126. Id. Comment 3, § 2-313 states:
No specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of the factors is made
part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave
them into the fabric of the agreement.
See Banks v. Continental Motors Corp., 251 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va.) aff'd 373 F.2d 314 (4th
Cir. 1966).
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ity.In On occasion, statements made after the close of the deal, upon deliv-
ery for example, may also be considered express warranties if the language
can justifiably be regarded as part of the agreement. 28
Since 1962, a plaintiff in Virginia cannot be barred from successfully
bringing an action against a manufacturer or seller of goods for breach of
an express or implied warranty despite the absence of contract, provided
the plaintiff might reasonably have been expected to "use, consume, or be
affected by the goods."'21 2 The Virginia legislature thereby wielded the blow
that breached the "citadel of privity"'30 and allowed a subpurchaser to sue
the manufacturer of a product and the nonpurchaser to sue the retailer or
manufacturer. 131 Despite the fact that privity had been one of the most
burdensome aspects of sales law transplanted to personal injury actions,
others remain. 32 In Virginia, an injured consumer must still run the gaun-
tlet of notice, disclaimer and limitation of remedies as a prelude to recov-
ery.
1. Notice
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-607(3)(a) provides: "Where a
tender has been accepted . . . the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy."
Notice requirements, whether arising from section 2-607(3)(a), or from
agreement of the parties, serve two basic purposes.", In addition to afford-
ing the seller an opportunity to remedy the defect voluntarily, thereby
preventing needless litigation while minimizing damages, a notice require-
ment also allows the seller to prepare his defense by timely investigating
the claim. 3
127. See, e.g., Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 330, 26 S.E. 865 (1897). If the seller assumes to
assert a fact about which the buyer is ignorant, or makes a representation of quality which
the buyer relies on as a warranty and is thereby induced to make the purchase, the seller is
bound by it as a warranty regardless of intention.
128. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 7; see U.C.C. § 2-209.
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1975) (formerly included as § 8-654.3).
130. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) (Cardozo,
C.J.: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding these days apace.").
131. Emroch, supra note 1, at 985.
132. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965). "[IThe liability
which [section 402A] would impose is hardly more than what exists under implied warranty
when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect,
and limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties."
133. Project, Article Two Warranties In Commercial Transactions, 64 CoRNELL L. Ray. 30,
265 (1978).




The drafters of the Code intended that notice requirements apply to
retail as well as commercial consumers.'35 Consequently, it has been criti-
cized as a "booby trap for the unwary""'3 and as a "tempest in a teapot"'37
when applied to a case involving personal injury. Although the Virginia
Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to consider the ramifications
of the Code requirement in the personal injury context,'38 potential
problems, irrelevant to a tort-based action, do exist.
Although comment 4 to section 2-607 states that the notification re-
quirement of the Code was not designed to bar a good faith consumer
from his remedy, the language of the Code makes no such distinction.'3
Thus, until the court is called upon to determine whether the standard for
the two groups will vary and, if so how, the requirement poses at least a
potential problem.
One such problem presented by the scarcity of case law in the area con-
cerns the consumer-plaintiff's responsibility to give notice to manufactur-
ers and sellers throughout the production chain. Assume that it is P, the
purchaser, who is injured when his lawnmower explodes and that he gives
timely notice (whatever a court determines that to be on a case by case
basis) to M, the manufacturer. If, at a later date, P decides to join R, the
retailer, or A, the assembler, will his notice to M be sufficient to satisfy 2-
607's requirements with respect to these parties? Conversely, if P initially
chooses to sue R and later decides to join M, what result?
135. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4 which states: "'A reasonable time' for notifica-
tion from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards [from those applicable to a
commercial buyer]."
136. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1130.
137. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 604.
138. Cf. Jacot v. Grossman Seed & Supply Co., 115 Va. 90, 78 S.E. 646 (1913) (reasonable
notice between commercial parties for defective product).
Other jurisdictions that have had the opportunity to consider the issue have held that the
notice requirement of § 2-607(3)(a) does apply to personal injury suits. See, e.g., Bennett v.
United Auto Parts, Inc., 294 Ala. 300, 315 So. 2d 579 (1975); Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56
Il1. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Nugent v. Popular Markets, Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228
N.E.2d 91 (1967); See also cases cited infra at note 141. But cf. Wilson v. Modem Mobile
Homes, Inc., 376 Mich. 342, 137 N.W.2d 144 (1965) (notice is not a prerequisite in warranty
suits arising by legal implication distinction from contract of sale).
139. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) defines buyer as "a person who buys or contracts to buy
goods."Cf. Wright v. Bank of California, 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14
(1969) ("The plain language of the statute cannot be varied by reference to the comments").
140. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778
(1968), where plaintiff severely cut her hand as she was attempting to open a soda bottle
manufactured by "Warwick" and sold by "Boulevard." Written notice was given to Warwick
four months after injury but Boulevard was not informed until eight months later and then
only informally. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island assumed notice requirements applied
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Although it is usually held that third party beneficiaries need not give
notice as a prerequisite to maintaining suit for breach of implied war-
ranty,"' the rule may seem anomalous to a plaintiff-purchaser who is
barred by failure to comply with section 2-607(3)(a). Consider Chaffin v.
Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co."' where plaintiffs daughter had pur-
chased a bottle of contaminated soda. When the plaintiff sued for per-
sonal injury caused by the soda, the court waived section 2-607(3)(a)'s
notice requirements since the plaintiff had not purchased the soda. Had
plaintiff's daughter been injured while sharing the soda, the court, im-
pliedly, would have required that she timely notify the manufacturer or
seller. This distinction seems at least as tenuous as the pre-Code privity
distinction drawn in Hazelton v. First National Stores, Inc.,"' where, al-
though a housewife purchased and prepared meat infected with trichinae,
neither she nor her children were entitled to sue for breach of implied
warranty since it was held that she was acting as an agent for her hus-
band who had paid the grocer.
2. Limitations on Warranty Liability
Although the Code provides for the creation of express"' and implied"'
warranties, regardless of the intent of the seller,' and irrespective of the
presence of a sales contract, 4 ' sellers can, and normally do, seek to pro-
tect themselves by excluding or limiting liability through carefully drafted
contracts."'
Section 2-316 prescribes the methods by which warranties, express or
implied, can be excluded or modified. The very idea that sellers should be
allowed to disclaim express warranties may seem unfair since, by defini-
in personal injury suits and held that "fairminded men could draw but one inference,
namely that the notice given to Boulevard was not given within the reasonable time contem-
plated by § ... 607(3)(a)." 248 A.2d at 782.
But cf. Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. Ct. 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (1978),
wherc she Appellate Court of Illinois stated, "the implied warranty of the manufacturer is
tenderee along with the goods to the ultimate consumer by his immediate seller, and notice
to the immediate seller in the ordinary course of events enures to the benefit of the remote
manufacturer."
141. See, e.g., Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Sup. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965);
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
142. 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 513 (1972).
143. 88 N.H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937).
144. U.C.C. § 2-313.
145. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
146. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
147. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315.
148. Project, Article Two Warranties, supra note 21, at 170.
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tion, they go to the "basis of the bargain." '49 However, 2-316(1) provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of
this Article on parole or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limi-
tation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
The authors of the section reasoned that preference should be given to
buyer's expectations resulting from an express warranty created by prom-
ise, description or sample over a "boilerplate" disclaimer. 10 If M had, for
example, included a written warranty stating that the lawnmower was
free from defects, he could not avoid liability by pointing to another
clause in the sales contract that provided that the manufacturer would
not be liable for repairs that became necessary due to defective parts.'5 '
However, if M gave P a limited warranty for repair and replacement of
defective parts, followed by a clause stating that "warranties herein are
expressly IN LIEU of any other express or implied warranties of
MERCHANTABILITY,"5 ' it is reasonable to construe the warranty and
the disclaimer as consistent with each other and the limitation will be
operative.11
Since, at least presumably, conflicting express warranties and disclaim-
ers rarely appear in sales forms,'54 other disclaimers are more pertinent for
the purposes of this article. Section 2-316(1) offers additional protection to
a seller through the use of the Code's parole evidence provision, section 2-
202. This section recognizes the sales contract to be the total agreement of
the parties, thus precluding the court's consideration of the warrantor's
149. J. WHrrs & R. SUMMERS, UNnaORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972).
150. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1 states that the section "seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with language of express warranty."
151. To be effective, such warranty would have to comport with the requirements of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2303
(1976). See text accompanying notes 188-219, infra.
152. Of course the requirements of § 2-316(2), including conspicuousness, must be met for
effective exclusion of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
153. Cf. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
(express warranty clause very similar to the one presented in text). Although the court held
the disclaimer invalid, White and Summers state that the disclaimer and warranty clauses
do not conflict since the disclaimer only disclaimed warranties other than "[t]he warranties
herein" and the contract did make some express warranties. WHM & SUMMERS, supra note
149, at 353.
154. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 149 at 353. But cf. the cases collected in Project, Arti-
cle Two Warranties, supra note 21, at 173-75 involving conflict of express warranties of lim-
ited duration.
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prior oral promises.' If, in our hypothetical, R stated to P that the lawn-
mower he was about to purchase was warranted for all mechanical parts
for one year, and thereafter P signed a sales contract which contained the
usual merger clause language that all conditions and agreements were
covered solely by that contract, 2-202 would operate to bar admission of
the oral promise."' P may, however, introduce prior oral statements by R
if they are consistent with the terms of the contract' 7 or to clarify an
ambiguity."' Thus, an enforceable oral warranty will be created only if it
is consistent with the terms of the merger clause. The probable result of
the interplay of sections 2-316 and 2-202 is an effective exclusion of any
oral promises upon which P may have relied as part of the "basis of the
bargain"'59 by reducing the warranty issue to an examination of the four
comers of the agreement.
The Code also provides for the exclusion or modification of implied
remedies. Section 2-316(2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantabili-
155. U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade [§ 1-205] or by course of performance [§
2-208]; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.
156. See, e.g., Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chemicals, Ltd., 24 Ariz.
App. 331, 538 P.2d 760 (1975), as cited in Project, Article Two Warranties, supra note 21, at
176, where the court rejected a buyer's contention that oral representations made by the
seller were parole warranties under § 2-316(1) and therefore not inadmissible under § 2-202.
The parole representations are not "words . . .relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty" within § 2-316(1). 538 P.2d at 763 (discussing Aim. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-
2333(A)(1956)).
157. See, e.g., Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966). But cf.
Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (oral affirmations that a mobile home
would conform to a sample admitted although the sales contract contained a blanket
disclaimer).
158. A writing intended as the final agreement of the parties may be explained or supple-
mented "by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agree-
ment." U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
159. Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the U.C.C.-How to Succeed
in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 DEN. L.J. 579, 594 (1969). P
must also shoulder the burden to show consistency of disclaimer and warranty.
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ty and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify
any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and con-
spicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if
it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
As stated by the section, an exclusion or modification of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability must mention merchantability in clear conspicu-
ous language.' The section allows for additional methods of disclaimer of
the warranty, notwithstanding section 2-316; it may be excluded or modi-
fied by expressions or language which, in "common understanding" calls
the buyer's attention to the seller's intention to exclude,' by examination
of the goods or the refusal to do so by a buyer when such examination
would have revealed defects,"6 2 and by course of dealing, performance, or
usage of trade.63
The potentially inequitable consequences of allowing the "intricacies of
sales law" to bar consumer recovery in a personal injury suit is well
demonstrated by Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton."' Plaintiff, injured when his
car suddenly veered to the right, jumped a guard rail and fell twenty-six
feet to the street below, alleged that the accident occurred due to a defect
in the steering mechanism. The court held that plaintiff's cause of action
in negligence, strict liability in tort, and tortious misrepresentation based
on defendant's advertisements, was barred by the statute of limitations.
Thus, plaintiff was forced to rely solely on a warranty theory of recovery .
The court ruled that Ford had disclaimed the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness in the manner required by section 2-316(2),111
and, since the one-year or 12,000 mile express warranty had expired
before the time of plaintiff's injury, the court concluded that he had no
remedy at law.' 6
Section 2-316(2) also provides for the exclusion or modification of the
160. The New York courts have held that the requirement for effective exclusion of
merchantability by conspicuous language extends to limitations of remedy as well as war-
ranty disclaimers. See, e.g., Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d
677 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977).
161. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) states that expressions such as "as is" or "with all faults" will
be sufficient.
162. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
163. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
164. 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1974).
165. Id. at 692.
166. Although plaintiff contended the exclusion of implied warranties was unconscionable,
the court cited Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. Rav. 485 (1967), and stated that most commentaries answer this question in the nega-
tive. 511 S.W.2d at 693-94.
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implied warranty of fitness. To exclude or modify this warranty, a warran-
tor need merely demonstrate his intention to disclaim by conspicuous
general language.'67
Although 2-316 may provide adequate coverage for parties involved in
commercial transactions, it does not afford sufficient protection for the
retail consumer.'68 Often a consumer will be misled by the very appear-
ance of a warranty since he may perceive it as a grant of rights rather
than a limitation of liability.'69 Even when the consumer realizes the na-
ture of a limited warranty combined with a disclaimer, he is" rarely in a
position to bargain with the warrantor since, as a practical matter, most
consumer contracts are contracts of adhesion.' Due to this non-bar-
gained-for aspect of retail consumer transactions, the provisions of 2-316
intended to protect consumers actually "become objective standards that
alert sellers can easily meet thereby effectively maximizing the
probability of successful insulation."' 7 ' Even when consumers may be in a
position to bargain or shop around for a better deal, technical language
such as that required for effective disclaimer by 2-316, may not bring
across the full legal implications intended. 2
In an attempt to increase buyer protection, the draftsmen of the Code
created a presumption that warranties are cumulative.7 3 However, section
2-317 can, in effect, give warrantors an additional way of avoiding liability
for a defective product. The section provides that when it is unreasonable
to construe warranties, whether express or implied, as consistent and cu-
mulative with one another, "the intention of the parties shall determine
167. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) provides that conspicuous language stating: "There are no warran-
ties which extend beyond the description of the face hereof" is sufficient.
168. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 575-76.
169. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 7702, 7706.
170. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. RaV. 629, 631-32 (1943).
171. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 577.
172. Certainly, most persons buying goods in regular course from a professional merchant
assume that the goods will suit some useful purpose and. . . will not subject him to
unreasonable risk of harm. In the eyes of many consumers language such as "as is" or
"with all faults" probably only suggest [sic] that the goods are not top quality, but
hardly that the goods may have no usefulness at all and, in fact, may actually be
harmful.
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W.
REs. L. Rav. 5, 41-42 (1965). See also Reforming the Law, supra note 5, at 1036.
173. "[Alll warranties are made cumulative unless this construction of the contract is im-
possible or unreasonable." U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 1.
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which warranty is dominant."'7 4 However, if an inconsistency is present, it
is presumed that the intention of the parties is such that: "Express war-
ranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."'7 Because of this section, if
P were given a limited express warranty regarding the lawnmower's ex-
pected performance, the implied warranty of merchantability might be
automatically disclaimed regardless of the warrantor's compliance with
the disclaimer provisions of section 2-316(2)."'
Once a warranty is effectively disclaimed, the seller is protected from
the possibility of incurring liability under it. Similarly, section 2-317 al-
lows a seller to limit his liability by providing that some warranties will
be superior to others. Another method of limiting liability", available to
the seller, is the Code's provision for limitation of remedies for enforceable
warranties.'
174. U.C.C. § 2-317.
175. U.C.C. § 2-317(c).
176. In Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967) the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court upheld, on grounds of freedom of contract and public policy, the valid-
ity of a disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness by an express warranty which stated
that the limited express warranty was "in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied."
However, because the case arose before the effective date of the U.C.C., the court did not
consider whether the text of the exclusionary language of the warrantor's express warranty
would be sufficient to exclude the implied warranty under the U.C.C.
Accord, Desandolo v. F & C Tractor & Equipment Co., 211 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968), where the Fourth District Florida Court of Appeals expressly rejected Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. The court upheld a disclaimer of the warranties of merchantability
and fitness in a written contract where the seller warranted a bulldozer to be free from de-
fects in materials and workmanship and added that this warranty was in lieu of all other
warranties, express and implied. The court reasoned that "extreme caution" should be exer-
cised when asked to void a contract as contrary to public policy; contracts involving privity
relationships should only be struck down on public policy grounds when it clearly appears
"there has been some great prejudice to the dominant public interest sufficient to overthrow
the fundamental public policy of the right to freedom of contract." Id. at 580 (quoting Bitu-
minous Cas. Corp. v. Williams, 154 Fla. 137, 17 So.2d 98, 101 (1944)). See also Construction
Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 921 (1969). But see Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. 478, 276 A.2d 807
(1970).
177. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2 provides: "This Article treats the limitation or avoidance
of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the
matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no
problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty."
178. U.C.C. § 2-719 provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceding section [§ 2-718] on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recover-
able under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
19801
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
A consumer may recover consequential damages for "injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."'" These
damages may be limited or excluded' by the parties unless to do so
would be unconscionable.'' The Code explicitly states that "[l]imitation
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable."'8 2 Section 2-719(3) thereby presents
the questionable but apparently intended"" situation recognized by Dean
Speidel.' M If R or any other warrantor, in the absence of express warranty,
attempted to limit P's potential consequential damages by so providing in
the sales contract, this limitation would be voidable since it is prima facie
unconscionable. If however, a seller included in the contract a disclaimer
of implied warranty which fully complied with section 2-316(2), the seller
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts;
and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
179. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
180. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
181. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
182. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
183. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded un-
less the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita-
tion of damages where the loss is commercial is not." (emphasis added).
Use of the disjunctive with regard to the disclaimer of consequential damages, followed
directly by the omission of "exclusion" with respect to damages for injury to the person,
demonstrates a legislative intent to allow a seller to exclude, by contractual disclaimer, con-
sequential damages for personal injury. This conclusion is further supported by § 2-719,
Comment 3 which states: "The seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties in the manner
provided in Section 2-316." (emphasis added). Section 2-316, Comment 2 adds: "If no war-
ranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty."
184. Speidel, supra note 5, at 837-38.
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would be protected from liability arising from the defective lawnmower. ' "
It might also be noted that, in our borrowed hypothetical, it is possible for
a seller to protect himself from liability to B and U. Although section 2-
318 precludes the defense of lack of privity in an action against a manu-
facturer or seller of goods if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufac-
turer or seller might reasonably have expected to "use, consume, or be
affected by the goods," the drafters of the section did not intend to pro-
hibit the use of a disclaimer which complied with section 2-316.'11
B. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,' 7 which was enacted and became
effective in 1975,'11 is the first federal attempt to affect transactions in-
volving warranties." 9 It is intended to supplement rather than replace the
Uniform Commercial Code. 9 ' Its stated purpose is "to improve the ade-
quacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and im-
prove competition in the marketing of consumer products,"' 9 thereby in-
creasing competitive pressures and enhancing the quality of warranty
offered by competitors. 92 Although the Act is of potentially greater benefit
to jurisdictions like Virginia that have not attempted to supplement the
185. Although many courts would employ § 2-302, the "unconscionability provision" of
the Code, to avoid this harsh result, regardless of apparent legislative intent, at least one
commentator finds this to be "incredible":
Here is 2-316 which sets forth clear, specific and anything but easy-to-meet stan-
dards for disclaiming warranties. It is a highly detailed section, the comments to
which disclose full awareness of the problem at hand. It contains no reference of any
kind to section 2-302, although nine other sections of article 2 contain such references.
In such circumstances the usually bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets
the requirements of 2-316 might still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302
seems explainable, if at all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare case) at-
tempted sneakiness.
Leff, supra note 166, at 523 (footnotes omitted).
186. "To the extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under which warranties
are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally
operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section." U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment
1.
187. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 101, 88
Stat. 2183 (1975)). [The statute will hereinafter be referred to as the Magnuson-Moss Act or
as the Act].
188. 15 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
189. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55
N.C. L. REV. 835, 835 (1977).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976) states: "Nothing in this chapter shall invalidate or
restrict any right or remedy of any consumer under State law or any other Federal law."
191. Id. § 2302(a) (1976).
192. Eddy, supra note 190, at 861-62.
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U.C.C. by means of additional state legislation,'93 its success, as viewed
during the past four years, is questionable.'94
Under the provisions of the Act, a manufacturer or seller is not required
to warrant his product.'95 The Act additionally provides that if he does so
orally,' or if the product is not a "consumer product,"'97 the warranty
does not fall within the scope of the Act. The congressional intent of the
federal legislation is to improve the clarity of warranty terms through im-
193. See Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 584-97. States such as Massachusetts, Mary-
land, West Virginia, and Kansas have enacted supplementary legislation which temper war-
ranty disclaimers more effectively than the Magnuson-Moss Act.
194. The Act is based on the premise that, as a practical matter, suppliers of consumer
goods vigorously use written express warranties as advertising and merchandising devices.
But see Study, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Act, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1117
(1979), which detailed the effect of the Act upon consumer product warranties and deter-
mined that there has been little shift toward improved protection since passage of the Act.
The study compared forty-nine manufacturers offering various types of warranties for six
consumer products before enactment of the Act with warranties proffered by those same
manufacturers after the Act became effective. The author determined that 73% of the war-
rantors were using the same warranty they had previously used while 8% actually offered
decreased consumer protection. At the same time 18% increased consumer protection with
only three of the six products covered by full warranties. Id. at 1126-44.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (1976).
196. Id. § 2302(a) defines the scope of the Act to include "any warrantor warranting a
consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty." Section 2301(6) defines
"written warranty" as "any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connec-
tion with the sale of a consumer product . . . which relates to the nature of the material or
workmanship . . [or is a written promise] to refund, repair [or] replace . . . such product.
The point has been raised that this definitional section in the Act may actually increase
the consumer's burden of proof since under U.C.C. § 2-313 a plaintiff need only show that
the warrantor's promise became part of the "basis of the bargain." Denicola, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Making Consumer Product Warranty a Federal Case, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 275-76 (1975); Comment, 11 U. Rtcs. L. Rav. 163, 166 (1976).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1976) defines consumer product as "any tangible personal prop-
erty which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in
any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed)." (emphasis ad-
ded). The question of whether a product is "normally used" within the intent of the Act is to
be answered independently of the actual use by a consumer. Products which are in fact used
for business purposes are covered by the Act if they would generally be used for "personal,
family or household purposes." Denicola, supra note 197, at 276. Thus an automobile - or a
lawnmower for that matter - used in the operation of a business is still considered a "con-
sumer product." Id.
Of course, the Act's focus on "consumer products" does not supplement state law in war-
ranties involving business products. An employee injured due to a defect in the business
machine his employer purchased from a manufacturer may recover workmen's compensa-
tion. However, any suit that he or his employer may bring for breach of warranty will be
governed solely by state law.
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proved disclosure"'5 and to increase the substantive protection offered by
warrantors by inducing compliance with "minimum federal standards for
warranty. ' 1
99
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1976) requires that "warrantor[s] warranting a consumer product
by means of a written warranty shall clearly and conspicuously designate such warranty" to
be a "full" or "limited" warranty. Section 2302(a) provides that warranties designated as
"full" shall "fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the
terms and conditions of such warranty" including:
(1) The clear identification of the names and addresses of the warrantors.
(2) The identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended.
(3) The products or parts covered.
(4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunc-
tion, or failure to conform with such written warranty - at whose expense-and for
what period of time.
(5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.
(6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty.
(7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain
performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any
person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligation set forth in the
warranty.
(8) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement pro-
cedure offered by the warrantor and a recital, where the warranty so provides, that
the purchaser may be required to resort to such procedure before pursuing any legal
remedies in the courts.
(9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the consumer.
(10) The time at which the warrantor will perform any obligations under the
warranty.
(11) The period of time within which, after notice of a defect, malfunction, or
failure to conform with the warranty, the warrantor will perform any obligations
under the warranty.
(12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not
covered by the warranty.
(13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a
reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty.
199. Id. § 2304 reads, in part:
(a) In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written
warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty -
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such consumer product within a
reasonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or failure
to conform with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor may not impose
any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on the product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach
of any written or implied warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or limita-
tion conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or malfunc-
tion after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy defects or
malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect
either a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part. . . .If
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The repercussions of the Magnuson-Moss Act will be felt primarily, as
intended,"'0 in sales involving warranties designated as "full." A warrantor
offering a "full" warranty or service contract is no longer free to disclaim
or limit the duration of the implied warranties. 1 Thus, Congress has ef-
fectively barred the use of a written full warranty combined with a dis-
claimer of implied warranties.
Despite this federal attempt to supplement consumer protection under
U.C.C. warranty law, substantial deficiencies remain. Although a full
warrantor may not presently disclaim implied warranties, he retains the
power to substantially control remedies for their breach. Section 2-
304(a)(3) states that a "full" warrantor "may not exclude or limit conse-
quential damages for breach of any written or implied warranty on such
product, unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the
face of the warranty."
Returning to our hypothetical, assume P was given the following con-
spicuous warranty appearing on the face of the sales contract:
Full Six Month Warranty-Remedy Limited to Repair or Replacement of
Defective Parts within a reasonable time. This remedy is IN LIEU of any
other express or implied warranties of MERCHANTABILITY and fitness.
Assume further that P then seeks consequential damages"2 for personal
injury as well as for damage to his house. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act,
we have the same problem arising from absence of parallel treatment of
disclaimer and remedy limitation, as we do under the U.C.C. Although it
has been argued that personal injuries could not' be successfully excluded
under section 2-715 since section 2-719(3) makes limitation of damages for
personal injury prima facie unconscionable,n this conclusion does not log-
ically follow since complete exclusion of consequential damages for per-
the warrantor replaces a component part of a consumer product, such replacement
shall include installing the part in the product without charge.
Subsection (b) additionally provides that the "warrantor shall not impose any duty other
than notification upon any consumer as a condition of securing remedy of any consumer
product which malfunctions, is defective, or does not conform to the written warranty." This
provision may contribute to current reluctance to fully warrant consumer products. For ex-
ample, warrantors may not be willing to incur potential expense for presentment of goods for
repair at a distant service center. See Eddy, supra note 189, at 865.
200. See 120 CoNG. REc. S21, 977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
The competitive nature of the marketplace will induce warrantors to fully warrant their
products.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976).
202. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) states: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
203. See, e.g., Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 612.
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sonal injury appears to have been clearly intended by the authors of the
U.C.C.04
Another interesting problem is presented by the Act. Suppose that P
lends the troublesome lawnmower to B, and B's house is destroyed when
the lawnmower explodes. Although the warrantor's obligations upon a
"full" warranty extend to "each person who is a consumer with respect to
the consumer product, '25 section 2-301(3) defines "consumer" as a buyer
of a consumer product and any other person who is entitled, by the terms
of such warranty or under state law, to enforce warranty obligations
against the warrantor. Although Virginia law would extend this protection
to anyone expected to "use, consume, or be affected by the product, ' '2
the remedies available under the Act are expressly limited to "repair, re-
placement, or refund" of the defective product."7 If the warrantor has pre-
viously disclaimed consequential damages, 20 B may be out of luck,
though P, happily, can recover the replacement value of his lawnmower.
This, however, does not appear to be the primary weakness of the fed-
eral legislation. The Magnuson-Moss Act allows a warrantor choosing to
offer a "limited" warranty to do so merely by stating that intention in
simple, conspicuous language.0 9 The warranty, then, need only comply
with the Act's disclosure requirements 0 and compliance with "federal
minimum standards for warranties" ' will be waived. Due to this distinc-
tion, although implied warranties cannot be altogether disclaimed," ' they
may be "limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of rea-
sonable duration, if the limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear
and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the
warranty. '21 3 The Henningsen"4 dilemma remains. If P had been given a
"limited" six-month warranty which complies with section 2308(b), the
204. Clark & Davis argue that in all probability the Federal Act uses the term "conse-
quential damages" to mean "economic loss" and not personal injury. Id. The disparity
presents yet another illustration of the potential dilemma awaiting consumers in a state that
has chosen to adopt statutory routes of recovery that tend to "freeze" solutions to often
complex and rapidly changing problems. See also Leff, supra note 166, at 516-23.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (1976).
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1976).
208. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
209. Id. § 2302(a).
210. Id.
211. Id. § 2304.
212. Id. § 2308(a).
213. Id. § 2308(b).
214. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., see note 22 supra (attempted contractual dis-
claimer of personal injury).
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implied warranties otherwise available to him' 5 would be pruned to a pe-
riod coextensive with the express warranty, '2 6 viz. six months.
The Magnuson-Moss Act has been anything but an unqualified success
in preventing consumer abuse. 27 Though it may eventually provide con-
siderable consumer protection with respect to prevention of deception,
and recovery of damages for a defective product, it does little to supple-
ment warranty as the sole source of strict liability recovery for personal
injury in Virginia.
C. Judicial Management of Disclaimers
Disclaimers are often not unreasonable in a commercial setting, partic-
ularly when the seller does not know the quality of his product and "the
buyer is willing to take his chances."2 '8 This rationale does not transfer
well, however, to the consumer new product sales sector.
Although courts generally uphold the doctrine of freedom of contract,
rarely has a consumer "with a provable warranty claim . . . been denied
full relief because of a disclaimer or other limitation. 2 19 Various com-
mentators have examined judicial attempts to avoid unfair disclaimer.20
215. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1976). Section 2308(b) conflicts with U.C.C. § 2-725(1) which
provides: "An action for breach of contract for sale must be commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the
period to not less than one year but may not extend it." (emphasis added). Although 15
U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall invalidate or restrict any right
or remedy of any consumer under State law," § 2-725(1) may not be controlling since the
warranty could be entirely excluded under § 2-316.
217. See Study, supra note 194, at 1144-45 where the author of an empirical study of the
accomplishments of the Magnuson-Moss Act concludes: "A simple tallying of the successes
and failures of the Act might indicate that overall it has been a failure. Of the Act's three
goals analyzed in this study-simplification, improved disclosure, and increased consumer
protection-only improved disclosure has met with any substantial success." However, the
author points out that the consumer may reap substantial benefit from increased and uni-
form disclosure under the Act. Id. at 1145. See also Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 584-617
in which the authors conclude that Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts and West Virginia
have eradicated problems associated with §§ 2-316 and 2-719 more efficiently with supple-
mental warranty legislation at the state level than with the Magnuson-Moss Act.
218. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 3, at 831.
219. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 577-78. "The rationales employed by the judiciary
to reach such results have ranged from the inarguable to the unbelievable. Indeed, since the
result is usually preordained, a fair summary of disclaimer cases would be that getting there
is all the fun." See also Leff, supra note 166.
220. One analysis reveals that courts have relied on three methods to avoid disclaimers or
limitations they consider to be unfair: "(1) painful scrutiny of disclaimer and limitation
clauses; (2) use of the U.C.C. prohibition against unconscionability; and (3) other very crea-
tive means." Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 578. See also Moyle, supra note 159, at 613-18.
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It would appear that, as a practical matter, most courts will try to provide
compensation for the injured consumer with a bona fide cause of action,
even if it means that the court must stretch to obtain such a result.2'
Warranty, as a device for strict liability recovery for personal injury, con-
tinues to carry "far too much luggage in the way of undesired complica-
tions, '"2 2 and leads the injured consumer "down a very thorny path"''
indeed.
D. Judicial Consumer Protection
The Virginia Supreme Court should adopt section 402A of the Restate-
ment, or some variation thereof,2u the next time it is confronted with a
221. Mathews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973) demonstrates the lengths
courts will go to avoid unfair warranty clauses. Mathews bought a car from one of Ford's
dealers and was later injured because of a defect in the gear shift selector mechanism. The
contract for sale included a limited express warranty from Ford, which expressly included its
dealer, for replacement of defective parts within 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever came
first. A disclaimer followed stating: "This warranty is expressly IN LIEU of any other ex-
press or implied warranty including implied WARRANTY of MERCANTABILITY or FIT-
NESS." Id. at 401, n.3. The defendant-dealer argued on appeal that the express warranty
excluded any liability for plaintiff's personal injuries. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defen-
dant's liability since any attempt to limit responsibility for damages to repair or replace-
ment of the defective parts was prima facie unconscionable under § 2-719(3). The court
noted that the Virginia Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile, Inc., 207 Va.
972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967), had held that a disclaimer of implied warranties was not con-
trary to public policy. 479 F.2d at 403. It stated that defendant's reliance on Murray was
unfounded since "Murray was a suit for recission of contract, not for personal injuries." Id.
at 403-04. A reading of Murray, however, clearly shows that the Virginia Supreme Court
made no attempt to distinguish cases involving disclaimers of liability for defective products
from those involving personal injuries. In fact, the court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (Supreme Court of New Jersey held invalid a
limited express warranty disclaiming implied warranties in a personal injury suit) and
stated: "its questionable acceptance in other jurisdictions . . . fail[s] to convince us of the
efficacy of following the action of the New Jersey court. We are loath to make such abrupt
changes in settled law and reluctant to declare invalid the formal undertakings of parties for
such vague reasons of public policy." 207 Va. at 977, 154 S.E.2d at 144. The court reasoned
that if there existed "overriding reasons of public policy" for voiding a disclaimer, the legis-
lature would have known of them in 1964 when it adopted § 8.2-316. Id. at 978, 154 S.E.2d
at 145.
222. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 5, at 1133.
223. Id.
224. Most jurisdictions have opted for the flexibility available through judicial adoption of
strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., - W.
Va. __, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979) where the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected
402A's definition of a defective product as "unreasonably dangerous" to "the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics," and adopted a test it determined to be more satisfactory. That test consid-
ers "whether the involved product is defective in the sense that it is not reasonably safe for
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personal injury case in which strict liability in tort is pled as a theory of
recovery."' Although some commentators contend that any such adoption
should occur legislatively," 6 there is a strong argument in favor of judicial
adoption.12
The law of responsibility for injuries generally has developed case by case.
The courts have felt their way slowly because they have had to decide only
one case at a time. They can "back and fill" where social conditions seem to
be adversely affected by particular rules or variations. They create excep-
tions where the major rule creates anomaly. They very seldom move so fast
that the economic result of a particular rule is chaos, even though the scare-
mongers are always prone to make such predictions.22
One possible disadvantage of legislative adoption of 402A might be the
"boxing-in" of the development of strict liability in tort in Virginia. The
desired flexibility of the section would thereby be lost. Virginia's recent
adoption of section 55-70.1 illustrates how restrictive such statutory adop-
tion can be. This statute states that vendors impliedly warrant the habit-
ability of new homes.ns Before the enactment of this legislation, the
homeowner in Virginia had virtually no recourse against the vendor of a
defectively constructed home. In 1977 alone, building permits for 63,564
homes were issued,no but as late as August 1978, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that an implied warranty of fitness for intended use was not
extended to the sale of a new house.?' As a result, in this consumer area,
its intended use" as determined by "what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards
should have been at the time the product was made." Id. at 683.
See also Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978) (design defect) and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (manufacturing defect) where the California Supreme Court rejected
402A's requirement that a plaintiff prove a product "unreasonably dangerous" as well as
defective, and required proof of only a defective condition proximately causing injuries.
225. See Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort
Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. Ray. 697 (1978) for a criticism of recent products
liability cases; e.g. Heatner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (both decided on unplead theories).
226. See, e.g., Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 W. RFs. L. REv. 5 (1965); Titus, supra note 15; Note, Reforming the Law, supra
note 5.
227. See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490, 500 (1969) (Breitel, J., dissenting). See also Emroch, Caveat Emptor, supra
note 1; Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor Shanher,
18 W. Ras. L. Rav. 10 (1966).
228. Littlefield, supra note 227, at 22.
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
230. Comment, 13 U. RcH. L. Rsv., supra note 47, at 392, n.104.
231. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
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Virginia was ruled by the doctrine of "caveat emptor." 2 However, section
55-70.1 by no means offers extensive homeowner-consumer protection; its
statutory language restricts liberal expansion of its scope. The statute, for
instance, applies only to unoccupied, new dwellings or houses; leased
dwellings are excluded from the statute's coverage. Additionally, under
this statute, the warranty runs for only one year from the date of record
title transfer or vendee's taking of possession. While it is the trend to ex-
tend 402A merely to mass-produced homes,m some courts have inter-
preted 402A to afford more expansive coverage.? Left to future judicial
interpretation, 402A could provide great flexibility in this consumer area
in Virginia. For instance the lessee, as well as the purchaser, of a home
could be protected,ns and section 402A could conceivably be extended to
include old dwellings as well as new.26
When Virginia enacted its "anti-privity" statute in 1962, its provisions
were not intended to be locked into the U.C.C., thereby hampering per-
sonal injury suits with sales, contract and commercial trappings. 7 Al-
though the statute was, in part, a response to a determination by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court that the privity defense should not be abrogated in
cases involving nonfood products,m there is little evidence that the legis-
lature intended to preempt the products liability field with respect to per-
sonal injury actions by substituting the anti-privity statute verbatim for
the official text of section 2-31821 of the U.C.C. This line of reasoning is
consistent with the simultaneous adoption of section 1-103 which
provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
232. Id., 219 Va. at 289-90, 247 S.E.2d at 402-04. For an excellent study of the historical
developments in Virginia real estate transactions, see Comment, 13 U. RiCH. L. REv., supra
note 47, at 381-92.
233. See note 46 supra.
234. See note 49 supra.
235. Section 402A has allowed recovery of damages by lessees of chattels. See, e.g., Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 777-78 (1965).
402A could also be expanded to protect the lessee of real estate.
236. See note 50 supra.
237. Emroch, Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 166.
238. See General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulus, 203 Va. 66, 70, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1961);
Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equipment Co., 202 Va. 958, 963, 121 S.E.2d 471, 474
(1961).
239. Cf. Titus, supra note 15, at 767. The author contends that "[a]fter the Virginia legis-
lature enacted the Code and repealed the antiprivity statute by which the special food war-
ranty rule had been extended, one might very well conclude that the legislature intended the
Code to provide the exclusive non-negligence products-liability remedy."
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coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions.
Section 402A's critics do not seriously contend that strict liability has dis-
placed the provisions of the Code since, the Code's only direct reference to
tort liability expresses an intent of no ninterference.2 41 There are those
who contend that 1-103 recognizes the availability of "principles of law
and equity" merely to supplement the Code's provisions.24 ' If this were, in
fact, the case, the law of negligence and strict liability in consumer prod-
uct personal injury suits would be "eclipsed." 4 '
Although the question of whether the consumer personal injury field has
been preempted by the U.C.C. has been answered in the affirmative by
some commentators, '43 most courts either ignore the argument 4 or make
no reference to it. Other courts have confronted the issue squarely, and
have found that the Code and strict liability in tort are not incompatible.
Judge Fuchsberg, concurring with the New York Court of Appeals in Vic-
torson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co."' stated that the "overwhelming ju-
dicial authority throughout the country and a fair reading of legislative
purpose make clear that the better argument by far is that legislative pre-
emption of strict liability in tort was not intended by the drafters of the
code." ' As support for this proposition, he cited Dean Wade's account of
the history of the Uniform Commercial Code.4 In 1941, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the Committee of
the Whole, dropped section 16-B 8 from the Revised Uniform Sales Act
240. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 2 states that the section seeks to loosen the privity require-
ment "without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negligence."
241. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the U.C.C.
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123, 137 (1974).
242. Littlefield, supra note 229, at 31.
243. See, e.g., Dickerson, Products Liabilityf Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Sec-
tion 402A, 44 TENN. L. REv. 205 (1977); Shanker, supra note 227; Titus, supra note 15.
244. See, e.g., Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 38, 260 A.2d 111, 112
(1969).
245. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
246. 37 N.Y.2d at 407, 335 N.E.2d at 280-81, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
247. Id. See Wade, supra note 243.
248. Wade, supra note 243, at 132-35 recounts 16-B's legislative history as follows: Profes-
sor Karl N. Llewellyn, selected to serve as draftsman for the revised Sales Act, prepared and
published the second draft of the Uniform Sales Act in 1941. Section 16-B, a new provision
of the Act, was intended to facilitate suits against manufacturers, without regard to privity,
for marketing defective goods which could "foreseeably 'cause danger to person or prop-
erty.' " Id. at 132. The draft of Section 16-B reads as follows:
Section 16-B. (New.) Obligation to Consumer and to Dealer for Latent Dangerous
Defect.
(1) Where it can reasonably be foreseen that goods, if defective, will in their ordi-
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before it was passed in Article 2 of the U.C.C.24s Although section 16-B
was intended to preempt recovery in tort for breach of implied warranty,
it was rejected on the ground that it would not be acceptable to state
legislatures.ns "The drafters thus envinced their intent not to affect the
independent development of tort law by having warranty and strict liabil-
ity in tort impinge one on the other."' 1 Judge Fuchsberg reached this con-
clusion due, in part, to Professor Karl Llewellyn's indication that the dis-
tinction to be drawn was between tort and commercial law, and not
negligence and commercial law.n2
nary use cause danger to person or property, the manufacturer of the goods, by selling
them or delivering them under a contract to sell when such defect is not reasonably
apparent, assumes responsibility as follows-
(a) To any legitimate user thereof whose title or authority to use derives from the
manufacturer through the chain of merchandising of the goods as unused goods, who
in the ordinary course of use or consumption is injured in person or property or other-
wise by reason of the defect; and
(b) To any buyer or sub-buyer, under a contract to sell or a sale between
merchants, who, through a warranty reasonably made or incurred in ignorance of the
defect and in reliance on its absence, suffers damage due to such injury as is described
in paragraph (a).
(2) The general purpose of this section is to make the remedy available directly
against a person able to arrange both reduction and spread of the risk of dangerous
defects, and also to make the remedy accessible to the person injured. "Manufac-
turer" within the meaning of the section therefore includes a person who processes or
assembles or repacks goods which he thereafter markets for ultimate use in consump-
tion, and includes a person who by brand, tradename, label, or otherwise assumes as
against the user the position of a manufacturer or supervisor or sponsor of the manu-
facture. The liability also extends to any seller who delivers goods with knowledge of
the dangerous defect.
(3) This section is not subject to negation or modification by contract, except that
between merchants (and so far as is consistent with the warranty by operation of law
in Section 14 and with the rules on modification of remedy in Section 57,) [sic] a
merchant buyer may limit his own rights hereunder.
(4) This section neither states nor implies a policy with regard to goods which in
their ordinary use, and without defect, are dangerous only to particular persons aller-
gic or supersensitive to such goods.
249. When the draft was considered by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in the Committee of the Whole, the point was raised that the state
legislatures might be reluctant to pass the Code with Section 16-B. Professor Llewellyn's
response was that when the legislatures refuse to act, courts do. Section 16-B was subse-
quently dropped before the Revised Uniform Sales Act became Article 2 of the U.C.C. The
inference Professor Wade draws from the minutes of the Committee of the Whole is that
Professor Llewellyn was seriously concerned that the state legislatures would not pass the
Code with 16-B in it, and decided to settle for a much milder version of the provision which
the legislatures would be willing to adopt. Id.
250. 37 N.Y.2d at 406, 335 N.E.2d at 281, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
251. Id.
252. Id. at n.1.
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The Supreme Court of Oregon confronted the preemption issue in Mar-
kle v. Mulholland's, Inc.253 The majority of the court held that the plain-
tiffs personal injury action arising from the blowout of a recapped tire
could be brought on a strict liability in tort theory since the warranty
provisions of the Code did not preempt the consumer personal injury
field. 14 Noting that the intent of the legislature governs the question of
preemption, the court went on to state that, in the absence of legislative
history, courts are free to ascertain such intent:
It is our belief that the legislature would not have intended to pre-empt the
field and thus to prevent the development of case law for the additional
protection of consumers, particularly by way of a statutory scheme primarily
oriented to an entirely different field of law. . . . Where the results would
be regrettable . . . courts usually do not construe statutes in a manner that
would bring about such results in the absence of fairly specific 1 anguage. 5
Chief Justice O'Connell, specially concurring, voiced an objection to the
majority's determination of non-preemption. 6 He "reluctantly" con-
cluded that the Code controlled all products liability cases involving
breach of implied warranty despite the fact that "the requirements of the
Code relating to notice and disclaimer do not make much sense in the
field of personal injury cases."2 7 The Chief Justice reasoned that since the
Code expressly deals with personal injury cases,"' section 1-103 cannot be
interpreted as giving a "court the license to create a separate body of
common law which covers substantially the same field and displaces the
Code's explicit provisions."2 9
Dean Wade recognized that the response from the courts260 to argu-
ments such as the one posed by Chief Justice O'Connell has not been
adequate.26  He suggests that those who argue that the Code has pre-
empted the field, thus precluding the availability of strict liability in tort
253. 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973).
254. Id. at 535.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 536.
257. Id.
258. The Chief Justice cites Oregon's statutory equivalent of U.C.C. §§ 2-715(2), 2-719(3),
2-318, and the official comments to §§ 2-318 and 2-607. Id. at 537.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970) (U.C.C. paral-
lels the doctrine of strict tort liability but they are "different breeds of cat"); Larson v. Clark
Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 277, 518 P.2d 308, 309 (1974) ("warranties provided by the UCC
are not the exclusive means of recovery without a showing of negligence or fault"); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 88 (Fla. 1976) (presently, "there is no legislative
impediment to the adoption of this doctrine").
261. Wade, supra note 243, at 125.
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for consumers injured by defective products, can be answered by viewing
strict liability as negligence per se. Wade postulates that one solution
,would be for
the courts . to lay down "once and for all," a rule that it is negligence for
a person who is engaged in the business of selling a product to sell it or put
it on the market when it is in an unreasonably dangerous condition. This
would be a part of the law of negligence and would in no way be impaired by
the provisions of the U.C.C., and yet it would amount to strict liability in
the sense that imposing liability for violation of the pure food statute
amounts to strict liability.262
Thus, if the common-law adoption of strict liability is viewed as negli-
gence per se, the cause of action is irrefutably tort-based and outside the
preemptive sphere of the U.C.C.
The argument for preemption should not receive favorable reception
when strict liability is considered by the Virginia Supreme Court. Two
recent decisions by the courts of neighboring states counsel against pre-
emption. The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.2 18 expressly rejected the contention that the Maryland legislature
intended to prevent further development of products liability law by the
courts, 8 1 and proceeded to adopt 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. In so doing, the court cited approval of Wade's argument against
preemption.2 11 Phipps is all the more persuasive since, in 1971, the Mary-
land legislature enacted a statute which rendered unenforceable any dis-
claimer of implied warranties or remedies for breach of warranty for con-
sumer goods.2 11 Clearly, the Maryland court believed that the legislature,
had it so intended, would have confined consumer-plaintiffs to a warranty
262. Id. at 139-40.
263. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
264. 363 A.2d at 962.
265. 363 A.2d at 963.
266. MD. Com. LAw CoDE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975) provides:
Limitation of exclusion or modification of warranties to consumers.
(1) The provisions of § 2-316 do not apply to sales of consumer goods, as defined
by § 9-109, services, or both.
(2) Any oral or written language used by a seller of consumer goods and services,
which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for
breach of those warranties, is unenforceable. However, the seller may recover from the
manufacturer any damages resulting from breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
(3) Any oral or written language used by a manufacturer of consumer goods,
which attempts to limit or modify a consumer's remedies for breach of the manufac-
turer's express warranties, is unenforceable, unless the manufacturer provides reason-
able and expeditious means of performing the warranty obligations.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
theory of recovery. In the interest of consumer protection, and in the ab-
sence of express intent, the court saw no need to "regrettably" hold that
the field was preempted.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently adopted strict
liability in tort in Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co."8 ' The court
did not discuss parallel coverage by the Code of the products liability
field, 8 nor did it consider the possibility of preemption. Critics of strict
liability may find this case especially confounding in view of the fact that
the 1974 West Virginia Consumer Credit Act provided one of the best re-
sponses to objections concerning sales "intricacies" in consumer suits.
The warranty provisions of the statute prohibit any exclusion, modifica-
tion, or limitation of express and implied warranty and of all remedies for
breach of warranty. 6 ' They also provide that no action for breach of war-
ranty or negligence with respect to consumer goods shall fail because of
absence of privity between the consumer and the manufacturer or seller.20
Although "with one short chop the statute destroys the twin citadels of
privity and disclaimer,"2' the West Virginia court recognized that an ac-




The Virginia consumer should be able to hold a manufacturer or seller
267. 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
268. Id. at 676 n.12.
269. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107. Disclaimer of warranties and remedies prohibited.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary with respect to goods
which are the subject of or are intended to become the subject of a consumer transac-
tion, no merchant shall:
(1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any warranty, express or im-
plied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose;
or
(2) Exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy provided by law, including
the measure of damages available, for a breach of warranty, express or implied.
Any such exclusion, modification or attempted limitation shall be void.
270. W. VA. Cons § 46A-6-108. Breach of warranty; privity abolished.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no action by a consum-
er for breach of warranty or for negligence with respect to goods subject to a son-
sumer transaction shall fail because of a lack of privity between the consumer and the
party against whom the claim is made. An action against any person for breach of
warranty or for negligence with respect to goods subject to a consumer transaction
shall not of itself constitute a bar to the bringing of an action against acother per-
son.
271. Clark & Davis, supra note 43, at 594.
272. 253 S.E.2d 666, 678-84.
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of a defective product which causes personal injury strictly liable in tort.
It has been argued that section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
effectively "eclipses" products liability causes of action under the U.C.C.
since it precludes defenses such as notice, disclaimer, and modification of
remedy. However, while courts must protect the parties' freedom of con-
tract, no manufacturer or seller should be free to contractually avoid lia-
bility for injury caused by a defective product. The judiciary, further-
more, will not be intruding upon legislative authority if 402A is adopted
as a theory of recovery in those cases involving personal injury or damage
to property other than to the product itself.

